Salvaging Democracy for West Papuans in the Face of Australia-Indonesia Obstruction by Webb-Gannon, Camellia B
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Social Sciences - Papers Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities 
2015 
Salvaging Democracy for West Papuans in the Face of Australia-Indonesia 
Obstruction 
Camellia B. Webb-Gannon 
University of Wollongong, camellia@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/sspapers 
 Part of the Education Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Webb-Gannon, Camellia B., "Salvaging Democracy for West Papuans in the Face of Australia-Indonesia 
Obstruction" (2015). Faculty of Social Sciences - Papers. 4017. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/sspapers/4017 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Salvaging Democracy for West Papuans in the Face of Australia-Indonesia 
Obstruction 
Abstract 
This article argues that the democratic ideals espoused by Australia and Indonesia fall short in 
application to West Papua and West Papuans, and notes that such shortcomings are legitimated by 
mainstream media's exoticist portrayals of West Papuans, particularly in Australia. The antidemocratic 
policies and processes of each government with regard to West Papua actually enable the (by and large) 
"good" bilateral relations at the state level to remain intact. However, this article contends that democracy, 
as practiced by civil society actors at the grassroots and digital network level in Australia and West 
Papua, creates cracks in the official Australia-Indonesia state relationship. Australian concerns over 
Indonesian human rights abuses in West Papua have traditionally been overlooked at the state level in 
favor of pursuing an amicable bilateral relationship. However by forging digital activist networks locally 
and internationally-including building West Papuan-indigenous Australian partnerships, West Papuans are 
participating in a grassroots democratization process with global outreach, refusing to be sacrificed on 
the altar of regional realpolitik. The article concludes with a cautionary account of an apparent attempt by 
an opportunistic Australian political movement to hijack West Papuan democratization for its own ends, a 
threat West Papuan and Australian civil society activists are currently moving to contain. 
Keywords 
salvaging, australia-indonesia, obstruction, face, papuans, west, democracy 
Disciplines 
Education | Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Publication Details 
Webb-Gannon, C. (2015). Salvaging Democracy for West Papuans in the Face of Australia-Indonesia 
Obstruction. Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 13 (47), 1-1-1-13. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/sspapers/4017 
 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 13 | Issue 47 | Number 1 | Nov 23, 2015
1




This article argues that the democratic ideals
espoused by Australia and Indonesia fall short
in  application  to  West  Papua  and  West
Papuans, and notes that such shortcomings are
legitimated  by  mainstream  media’s  exoticist
portrayals  of  West  Papuans,  particularly  in
Australia.  The  antidemocratic  policies  and
processes of each government with regard to
West Papua actually enable the (by and large)
“good” bilateral relations at the state level to
remain intact.  However,  this article contends
that  democracy,  as  practiced by civil  society
actors  at  the  grassroots  and  digital  network
level  in  Australia  and  West  Papua,  creates
cracks in the official Australia-Indonesia state
relationship.  Australian  concerns  over
Indonesian human rights abuses in West Papua
have traditionally been overlooked at the state
level in favor of pursuing an amicable bilateral
relationship.
However  by  forging  digital  activist  networks
locally  and internationally—including building
West  Papuan- indigenous  Austral ian
partnerships, West Papuans are participating in
a  grassroots  democratization  process  with
global  outreach,  refusing to  be sacrificed on
the  altar  of  regional  realpolitik.  The  article
concludes  with  a  cautionary  account  of  an
apparent  attempt  by  an  opportunistic
Australian  political  movement  to  hijack  West
Papuan  democratization  for  its  own  ends,  a
threat West Papuan and Australian civil society
activists are currently moving to contain.
Map  showing  West  Papua  on  the  island  of  New
Guinea in relation to Australia and Indonesia.
West Papuans: cannibals or the sacrificed?
Who  isn’t  fascinated  by  a  cannibal  story  -
particularly  one  about  a  cannibal  act
purportedly  planned  in  the  past  decade?  In
2006, a weekly current affairs television show
hosted by a popular Australian network aired a
program introducing Wawa, a then six-year old
boy its television crew met during a so-called
first  contact  encounter  with  West  Papua’s
Korowai  people.  Wawa, the program alleged,
was  facing  imminent  cannibalization  by  his
tribe for suspicion of witchcraft. A media fiasco
followed in which the television network and its
main rival raced to produce a “rescue Wawa”
story. The rival’s controversial  presenter was
deported from West Papua for using a tourist
visa, and Wawa was eventually taken from his
home by the original network’s Sumatran tour
guide to live in Jayapura and, later, Sumatra.
Earlier  this  year,  a  staffer  of  the  first-
mentioned  current  affairs  program  informed
me that a follow up story on Wawa and the
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Korowai was being considered. The plan was to
take Wawa on a return visit to Korowai land,
ask him to compare his new school and city life
with that  of  his  village of  origin,  and assess
how  Korowai  ways  of  life,  including  the
practice  of  cannibalism,  had  changed  since
2006.
This  program  concept  i l lustrates  the
entrenched  ignorance  that  pervades  the
mainstream  Australian  imaginary  of  West
Papua  and  other  parts  of  Melanesia.
Anthropologist  Rupert  Stasch,  the  world’s
preeminent scholar on the social  relations of
the Korowai,  visited Wawa’s people after the
media  maelstrom  and,  through  conversation
with  those  who knew Wawa,  found out  that
“there was a predictably wide gulf between the
representations  that  had  circulated  in  the
international media and the boy’s actual history
as understood by his kin and co-villagers (who
were  unaware  of  the  media  coverage)”1.
Further,  “almost  all  persons  [Stasch]  spoke
with said that the exclusive reason the first film
crew’s guide had been approached by villagers
about taking the orphan to town was so that he
would  go  to  school,  become  literate  in
Indonesian, and return as a teacher, nurse, or
government official.  These numerous persons
matter-of-factly denied […] suggestions that the
boy had been rumored to be a witch, or had
been in danger of being killed”2.
Wawa in 2006
“First  contact”  tourism  and  journalism  are
sensationalist, essentialist and, with regard to
the  Korowai ,  mis leading  –  European
missionaries have lived with the Korowai since
the 1970s and the Korowai are knowing, if far
from equal,  agents in the marketing of  their
“culture” to outsiders. The removal of children
from  their  families  of  origin  by  Western
journalists  chasing  television  ratings  is  of
course ethically highly dubious. Yet, despite the
informed criticism directed towards the current
affairs  program  after  its  2006  West  Papua
foray, it has contemplated revisiting the Wawa
story.  West  Papua  has,  for  a  long  time,
threatened  the  stability  of  the  Australia-
Indonesia  relationship  but  Australian  citizens
have pressured their government not to let the
Indonesian government escape criticism for the
crimes  its  military  forces  commit  in  West
Papua. In portraying West Papuans as less than
civilized,  mainstream  Australian  media
fabrications such as the “Wawa story” serve to
uphold Indonesia’s ongoing colonial occupation
of West Papua. They also support an Australian
media-military complex—providing a veneer of
justification  for  Australian  training  of
Indonesian  security  forces,3—which  in  turn
“keeps  in  check”  the  “violent”  peoples  of
“Stone Age” Papua. Such portrayals4 feed into
one  of  two  broad  narratives  that  surround
military  and  government  bilateral  relations
between Australia and Indonesia in which West
Papua is treated by Australia as either a pawn
or  a  liability.  In  the  first  narrative,  that  of
“primitive  and  unpredictable  Papuans”,  the
Australian public gaze is momentarily averted
from the violence of the Indonesian military in
West Papua, and the pressure on the Australian
government to  hold Indonesia  accountable  is
relieved.  The  second  narrative  will  be  dealt
with in the remainder of this article.
***
This second narrative presents Indonesia as a
“normal”5 country – that is, democratizing, not
subject to military excesses, and accountable to
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the  rule  of  law.  The  Indonesian  government
frequently  asserts  that  these  apparent
attributes also extend to its rule in West Papua.
Yet,  upon  examination,  they  appear  to  be
observed more in the breach than otherwise.
The Australian government’s willingness to pay
lip service to Indonesian claims, for the sake of
harmonious  relations  with  Jakarta,  silences
West  Papuans’  grievances  at  the  official,
bilateral  level.
The  Australia-Indonesia  relationship  itself  is
often  portrayed  as  one  incrementally
strengthening  due  to  Indonesia’s  supposedly
increasing  democratization.  What  is  rarely
considered,  however,  is  the  extent  to  which
Australian democratic principles are applied to,
and  what  relationship  the  democratic
credentials of either government has with, the
political plight of West Papuans. Each of these
concerns  has  important  implications  for  the
civil  societies  and  governments  of  both
countries, as well as their bilateral relationship.
Indeed, it appears that it is mutual complicity
in the antidemocratic processes being enacted
in Indonesia and Australia with regard to West
Papua that  tends  to  strengthen the  bilateral
relationship at the state level. Simultaneously,
that “good” relationship is threatened by the
alternative processes of digital networking and
grassroots democratization which ignore state
borders and bring civil society in Australia and
West Papua closer together.
For  example,  much  has  been  made  of
Indonesia’s  democratization  since  the  fall  of
Suharto in May 1998, and the implementation
of  electoral  reforms  from  1999  onward.
However,  democratic  reforms  have  had  a
limited reach in West Papua. For example, in
2003, the province of Papua was divided into
two, “Papua” and “West Papua”, by the central
government,  contrary  to  local  wishes  and
national law. Local Papuan political parties are
banned6.  The  Freeport  mine  (see  Figure  3),
controlled by an American company that pays
huge  royalties  and  taxes  to  Jakarta,  exploits
West Papuan natural resources, wreaks havoc
on the environment and local communities, yet
yields negligible benefits to Papuan people7.
Freeport’s  Grasberg  mine  in  West  Papua.  Image
credit: Radio New Zealand International
And the Indonesia military operates with near
impunity  in  West  Papua.  In  December 2014,
four unarmed West Papuan youth were killed
and  17  more  injured  in  Paniai  when  the
Indonesian army and police opened fire on a
group of protesters. Although an investigation
into  this  massacre  was  opened,  it  has  been
compromised  by  police  involvement.  Military
and police violence has also been a mainstay
around Freeport’s  mines in  Timika since the
company  began  operations  in  the  1970s  as
security  forces  vied  with  each  other  for
lucrative  “protection”  contracts  for  the
company. There is strong evidence suggesting
that  security  forces  also  orchestrate  violent
conflict  around  the  mine  (for  example,
ambushes along the road leading to the mine)
and then blame such violence on the guerilla-
led Free West Papua movement,  legitimating
their own presence in the process8.
High  hopes  were  held  for  democratic
improvements  in  West  Papua  when  Joko
Widodo became Indonesia’s president in 2014.
In his most recent visit to the region, Widodo
released five political prisoners and announced
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that the ban on foreign journalists visiting West
Papua would be lifted. However West Papuan
activists  claim  that  the  release  of  the  five
prisoners,  who  were  required  to  ask  for
clemency, was tokenistic since some 500 more
protesters were subsequently arrested in May
and  June  this  year9.  Papua  observers  in
Indonesia, such as Andreas Harsono of Human
Rights Watch, also doubt the President’s power
to  carry  out  a  dramatic  reversal  to  the
longstanding international  media  blackout  on
West  Papua  kept  in  place  by  18  central
government  agencies  whose  permission  is
required to visit  the territory and who profit
from their visa vetting role10. Scholar of Papua,
Budi  Hernawan,  observes  that  Widodo  is
rapidly  losing  credibility  within  his  own
government.  The  military  is  agitating  for  a
presidential  decree  to  mandate  control  of
publ ic  order  by  the  army  and  for  an
amendment  to  the  law that  requires  such  a
decree  in  the  first  place11.  In  other  words,
according to Hernawan, the army is working
towards  bypassing  Presidential  checks  and
balances  in  order  to  once  more  practice,
unfettered,  the  fomentation  of  conflict  that
justifies  its  existence  in  the  far  reaches  of
Indonesia—particularly West Papua12.
Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo
Australian democracy and West Papua
In recent years, as democratic processes have
been rolled out in other parts of Indonesia, the
Australian  government  has  legitimated  the
charade  that  those  same  processes  are
reaching  West  Papua.  In  fact,  Australia  has
maintained  a  “pragmatic  complicity”13  in
Indonesia’s  treatment  of  West  Papua  since
Indonesia invaded the territory in 1962 (shortly
after  West  Papua’s  previous  colonizers,  the
Dutch East Indies, had made preparations with
West Papuans for an independent West Papua),
and  has  done  little  to  protest  the  litany  of
human rights crimes committed by the regime.
These include widespread instances of torture
and rape of West Papuans, forced removal from
traditional  lands,  environmental  devastation,
curtailment  of  civil  and  political  rights,
s t a r v a t i o n ,  a s s a s s i n a t i o n s  a n d
disappearances14. Such concerted violence has
stemmed  from  Indonesian  expansionist  and
resource exploitation endeavors in West Papua,
at tempts  to  eradicate  West  Papua’s
independence movement (formed in protest to
Indonesian occupation and fuelled by ongoing
Indonesian violence), and longstanding racism
against West Papuan people.
In  1962,  when  West  Papua’s  future  political
status  was  under  negotiation,  Australia’s
external  affairs  minister  Garfield  Barwick
asserted that it was not in Australia’s strategic
interest  to  counter  Indonesia’s  expansionary
designs  on  West  Papua;  Australia  would  be
better  served  forging  diplomatic  ties  with  a
non-communist  Indonesia15.  The  Australian
government  therefore  supported  the  US-
brokered  1962  New  York  Agreement  that
bequeathed the  territory  to  Jakarta,  and  the
subsequent rigged 1969 Act of Free Choice that
formalized West Papua’s ongoing annexation by
Indonesia.
Despite the fact  that West Papua’s status as
part  of  Indonesia  has  been  contested  ever
s ince,  Canberra 's  posi t ion  has  been
unwavering. As recently as 2006 Australia and
Indonesia negotiated the Lombok Treaty which
contained  a  “Papua  Clause”  committing  the
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Australian government to “not in any manner
support  or  participate  in  activities  by  any
person or entity which constitutes a threat to
the stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity
of the other Party, including by those who seek
to  use  its  territory  for  encouraging  or
committing  such  activities,  including
separatism,  in  the  territory  of  the  other
Party”16. Signing this agreement signalled the
Australian government’s willingness to curtail
the democratic freedom of its own citizens to
support  persons  involved  in  West  Papua’s
independence struggle; this, in order to assure
Indonesia  of  its  unconditional  recognition  of
Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua.
When  Mako  Tabun i ,  a  Wes t  Papuan
independence  activist,  was  murdered  in  the
street in Jayapura in 2012, eyewitnesses and,
later,  Australian  investigative  journalists,
asserted that the murder was committed by the
partly  Austral ian  funded  and  trained
Indonesian  anti -terror  pol ice  squad,
Detachment 8817. The following year three West
Papuan men climbed the walls of the Australian
consulate  in  Bali  immediately  prior  to  an
anticipated visit by Australian Prime Minister
Tony Abbott, seeking refuge and calling for the
release  of  political  prisoners  in  West  Papua.
Australian  academic  Clinton  Fernandes,  who
was on the telephone to the consulate at the
time of the incident, overheard an Australian
voice  threatening to  bring in  the  Indonesian
military and police to remove the Papuan men.
The latter were forced to flee the consulate,
fearful for their lives18.
In the aftermath of this incident Abbott stated
his desire to convey "in flashing neon lights"
that  attempts  to  “grandstand”  against
Indonesia  by  involving  Australia  were  "not
welcome".  Asserting,  as  Australian  leaders
regularly  do,  that  Australia  respected
Indonesia’s  territorial  integrity  and
sovereignty, Abbott added, following the lead of
Indonesian leaders, that “the situation in West
Papua was ‘getting better, not worse’”19.
The  combined  efforts  of  the  Indonesian  and
Australian governments to whitewash ongoing
brutalities in West Papua are under constant
pressure,  however.  Moreover,  since  most
Australian statements regarding relations with
Indonesia are prefaced with references to the
Australian  national  interest,  Indonesia  knows
Australian policy on West Papua is strategically
and,  at  times,  legally  contingent.  Indeed,
precedents  exist  for  Australian  support  of
human  rights  and  self-determination  in
contested Indonesian territories. In addition to
Australia’s  about  face  from  support  for
Indonesian sovereignty in East Timor in 1999
to  rejecting  it,  Australia  also  recognized  43
West Papuans who arrived in Australia in 2006
as legitimate asylum seekers and granted them
temporary protection visas, prompting Jakarta
to  recall  its  ambassador  from  Canberra  in
protest.
There have been other hints  that  Canberra's
continued acquiescence over West Papua has
its  limits.  After  allegations  emerged in  2013
that Australia had been spying on Indonesian
officials,  and  Indonesia  responded  by
threatening to cease cooperation on managing
“people smuggling”,  Abbott  reminded Jakarta
that  Australia  had  attempted  to  dissuade
Australian-based  West  Papuan  activists  from
traveling  by  boat  to  West  Papua,  effectively
implying that Australian support for Indonesian
sovereignty  over  West  Papua  was  tied  to
cooperation  from  Indonesia  on  issues  of
Australian  national  concern20.
All of this demonstrates that, at a state level,
both  Australia  and  Indonesia  are  willing  to
exaggerate  the  bona  fides  of  Indonesian
democracy in West Papua and collude to cover
up direct violations of democracy and human
rights  in  the  territory.  As  a  result  neither
country is acting altruistically with regard to
West Papua. Indonesia is vested financially in
occupying West Papua, and Australia is vested
financially  in  appeasing  Indonesia  and  thus
condoning  its  occupation  of  West  Papua21.
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Nevertheless,  there  is  hope  that  significant
shifts  in  Australia’s  approach to  West  Papua
might  be  possible.  At  present  though,  it
appears  that  the  strength  of  Australia-
Indonesia ties in relation to West Papua is in
inverse proportion to the degree of democracy
and  human  rights  respect  afforded  West
Papuans  and  their  Australian  supporters.
Grassroots democracy and digital networks
By contrast, transformative democratization, in
essence coordinated purposeful action by and
for  the  affected  people,  is  occurring  at
grassroots activist and digital network levels,
linking  West  Papuan,  other  Melanesian,  and
Australian  civil  society  communities  in
solidarity  against  state-centric  oppressive
concepts of sovereignty. This is expressed in a
burgeoning genre of West Papua independence
music being created by West Papuans and their
Melanesian  and  Australian  supporters  and
distributed digitally via YouTube, Soundcloud,
iTunes, Bluetooth and SD cards through ever
expanding  digital  networks22.  While  evidently
the  digital  revolution  has  not  impacted  all
populations  equally,  it  has  had  the  effect  of
spreading  music,  foundational  to  Melanesian
cosmology and the life force of West Papua’s
independence  movement23  widely  and  lifting
the  regional  profile  of  the  West  Papuan
struggle.  Moreover,  social  media  has  also
elevated the perceived urgency of the struggle
in  mainstream  Australia  and  internationally,
propelling  the  circulation  of  mobile  phone
videos such as those depicting the torture of
West Papuans24, and attracting the intervention
of internet activist hacker group Anonymous on
behalf of West Papuans25.
A grass roots activist movement—recognizing a
shared  history  between  indigenous  Papuans
and indigenous Australians of settler colonial
violence  and  cohabitation  of  the  prehistoric
continent  Sahul  (a  Pleistocene  era  landmass
that  included  mainland  Australia,  Tasmania,
New Guinea, Seram and possibly the island of
Timor)—has emerged over the past two years,
most dynamically in the initiative of the West
Papua  Freedom  Flotilla26.  This  project  has
involved  two  maritime  missions,  with  West
Papuan  and  Aboriginal  activists  using
Aboriginal  “passports”  and  West  Papuan
“visas” in an effort to carry water from Lake
Eyre  to  West  Papua—a  form  of  nonviolent
direct action highlighting West Papua’s violent
occupation and symbolizing Oceanic indigenous
articulations.
Freedom  Flotilla  poster  featuring  West  Papuan,
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags
(http://freedomflotillawestpapua.org/category/events/
page/2/)
Two other events are notable with regard to
West Papuan-oriented activism in Australia. In
April 2014 an office opened in Perth to carry
out  the  work  of  Oxford-based  West  Papuan
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refugee  and  independence  activist  Benny
Wenda and his Free West Papua campaign27.
Soon after, in June 2014, the author attended
the opening of the Federal Republic of  West
Papua’s  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs
Immigration  and  Trade  office  headed  up  by
Foreign  Minister,  Jacob  Rumbiak,  a  former
West Papuan political prisoner living in exile in
Melbourne.  The  office  was  located  in  an
architecturally  slick,  eco-friendly  complex  in
Melbourne’s  central  business  district  and  its
opening  was  officiated  by  various  local
government  officials,  indigenous  Australian
leaders, and a university representative. Both
of  these  of f ices  were  establ ished  in
contravention of the Lombok Treaty and remain
in  operation,  demonstrating  that  grassroots,
people-led  movements  can  thrive  in  the
interstices of top down, anti-democratic power.
Supporters  of  the  West  Papuan  rights
movement  in  Australia  include  artists,
academics,  people  of  faith,  lawyers  and
environmental  and indigenous rights activists
who are often loosely aligned with the several
city-based  Australia  West  Papua  Associations
and  who  work  in  tandem  through  these
networks. In July 2013, the West Papua Project
at The University of Sydney produced a citizens
tribunal,  the  first  of  its  kind  in  Australia,
weighing  evidence  and  hearing  testimonies
from survivors of the 1998 Biak Massacre in
which Indonesian security forces murdered up
to 200 West Papuans peacefully demonstrating
on the West Papuan island of Biak28.
The Indonesian military has never been held
accountable  for  this  massacre,  and  notable
Australian  legal  personalities,  concerned
academics  from institutions  across  Australia,
and other activists cooperated in an effort to
bring a degree of  justice and closure to the
victims even in the absence of a legal remedy.
In March 2015, several of the tribunal team led
by  Justice  John  Dowd  and  academic  Eben
Kirksey presented the evidence brief to Liberal,
Labor and Greens party politicians in federal
parliament and met with a favorable tripartisan
reception,  further  evidence  that  small
initiatives can reach the halls of power, if not
yet the decision-making chambers.
Australian  academics—some  of  whom  are
affiliated with the West Papua Project at The
University of Sydney—have also been involved
with West Papuan efforts to make their political
presence  known  in  the  Melanesian  region,
assisting the United Liberation Movement for
West  Papua  (ULMWP)  to  develop  its  latest
submission for membership to the Melanesian
Spearhead Group (MSG). The MSG, a political
bloc  comprised  of  the  four  Melanesian
countries – Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, the
Solomon Islands, and Fiji—was formed in 1986,
in  part  to  lobby France for  New Caledonian
independence. As such, the indigenous Kanak
independence  party,  the  Kanak and Socialist
National  Liberation  Front  (French:  Front  de
Libération  Nationale  Kanak  et  Socialiste,
FLNKS), has been an integral member of the
MSG from its inception. And West Papua has
for  several  years  sought  membership  on  the
same basis. A limited victory was celebrated in
June  2015  by  West  Papuans  and  their
supporters  when  West  Papua  was  granted
observer status in the MSG, although at  the
same meeting Indonesia was granted associate
membership, a higher level,  which somewhat
dampened West Papuans’ celebrations.
These  community-initiated  activities  of  West
Papuans  in  Australia,  and  of  Australians
working in solidarity with them, demonstrate
that  steps  toward  positive  change  in  West
Papua are being pushed from the bottom up
rather  than  the  top  down.  These  actions  in
Australia and West Papua suggest possibilities
for a brighter, more democratic future for West
Papuans, in spite of Indonesian and Australian
government efforts to stymie them.
Reclaim Australia and the Free West Papua
Party
A sobering  phenomenon  has  recently  cast  a
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shadow over the usually progressive Australia-
West  Papua  solidarity  movement.  A  political
party calling itself the Free West Papua Party
has been launched from Perth29, which appears
to  be  capitalizing  on  the  Free  West  Papua
Campaign  “brand”  created  by  dynamic  West
Papuan  activist  Benny  Wenda.  The  party
combines anti-Islamic ideology and unrealistic
goals,30  claiming to  possess  “the potential  to
quickly  free  West  Papua  through  the  next
Federal  Election”31.  In  July  2015  its  leader
delivered  a  speech  at  an  ultra-nationalist
Reclaim Australia rally  purporting to support
West Papuan freedom in an era of Islamization.
Campaigning for  West  Papua at  such events
conveys the impression that the fight for the
independence  of  West  Papua  is  primarily
religious  (i.e.  a  Christian  versus  Muslim
struggle), which it is not, although at times it
does  assume  a  religio-cultural  tone.  In  fact,
many  West  Papuans,  including  some
independence  leaders,  are  Muslim32.  Both
Australian  supporters  of  West  Papuan  rights
and West Papuans residing in Australia have
moved quickly to distance themselves from the
Free  West  Papua  Party  and  its  ideological
tenets and implications33.
Further, indigenous Australians are protesting
against  the  Reclaim Australia  movement34.  If
what  Reclaim Australia  supporters  are  really
trying to do is “reclaim” Australia for a majority
“caucasian  [sic]  and  Christian”35  population
(and those with “assimilationist”  aspirations),
then  it  hardly  seems  appropriate  for  an
Australian  political  party  to  drag  indigenous
West Papuans into the movement. Finally, as
previously  mentioned,  indigenous  West
Papuans  and  indigenous  Australians  are
already  working  together  in  a  dynamic
movement to recognise indigenous sovereignty
in  their  respective  lands  with  the  Freedom
Flotilla  initiative.  This  is  an  internally
organized, organic movement that represents a
positive reclamation and an indication, among
others (for example the progress made within
the  MSG,  the  tabl ing  of  West  Papuan
grievances at the Pacific Islands Forum36, and
the  rise  of  Pacific-wide  solidarity  for  West
Papua37)  that  the West Papuan independence
movement is garnering increasing international
awareness.
Yet  despite  this  forward  momentum,  West
Papua is in the grip of a serious demographic
crisis. A history of Indonesian state-sponsored
transmigration  and  continuous,  rapid  and
spontaneous  migration  from  other  parts  of
Indonesia  to  West  Papua,  coupled  with  high
mortality and morbidity rates for West Papuans
compared with non-Papuans38  has meant that
indigenous  West  Papuans,  since  2010,  have
become a demographic and cultural minority in
their  homeland39.  Even  though  many  West
Papuans  campaign  for  a  referendum  on
independence,  in  statistical  terms,  if  this
becomes an option for them as it did for the
East Timorese in 1999, it is unlikely to deliver
the  resu l t  hoped  fo r  by  ind igenous
independence-seekers. The future is likely to be
bloody,  as  West  Papuans  have  demonstrated
since the 1960s that they will not back down,
even in the face of military terror, from their
pursuit of independence.
When the  Suharto-era  general  and notorious
strongman  Prabowo  Subianto  was  Widodo’s
challenger  for  the  position  of  Indonesian
president  leading  up  to  the  last  election,
predictions  for  the  status  of  West  Papuans
should  his  campaign  be  successful  were
“apocalyptic”40. Yet Widodo’s apparent inability
to  stand up to  pressure from military forces
lobbying to sit above civilian authority may still
have  apocalyptic  consequences  for  West
Papuans should  the  military  subsequently  be
given freer reign in West Papua. If the result of
increased  militarization  in  West  Papua  is  a
showdown like that of East Timor’s 1991 Santa
Cruz massacre in which 250 protesters were
murdered,  international  civil  society pressure
might  occasion  a  multilateral  intervention.
Although the second of these possible futures is
West  Papuans’  most  immediate  hope  for
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independence,  both  are  grim.  Their  most
promising option, and the one in which most
efforts are currently being channelled, is the
strengthening  of  grassroots  democratic
networks  and  forging  of  regional  solidarity.
Time, however, is of the essence. Demographic
transition in West Papua is the key challenge.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to demonstrate that
it  is important that the Australian public not
take too narrow a view of Australian national
interest  –  the  Australian  government  has
already made that mistake with regard to West
Papua.  Indeed,  the  Australian  government
should remember that what it considers to be
in its best interest can change dramatically and
rather suddenly, as its 1999 intervention into
East  Timor  revealed.  The  Australian  public
would do well to follow the lead of indigenous
West  Papuans  and  indigenous  Australians  in
lobbying  the  Australian  government  and
demonstrating  to  mainstream  media  that
democracy in Indonesia and in Australia should
not  be  solely  for  the  benefit  of  privileged
ethnicities  and  the  already  rich.  Rather,
democracy  ought  to  encompass  politico-legal
ethics  and  processes  that  facilitate  the
meaningful self-determination of each society’s
most vulnerable groups. A healthy relationship
between  the  two  countries—one  that  valued
democracy in  each—would acknowledge both
in law and in practice the traditional custodians
of  the various territories  comprising the two
countries. It would be committed to fostering
peaceful  explorations  of  self-determination
engaging indigenous peoples as primary actors.
It would consider unacceptable the circulation
of  tired,  clichéd  and  frankly  dehumanizing
portrayals  of  West  Papuans  as  cannibals,  as
subjects  for  entertainment  on  Australian
television. Given the tragedy of Australia’s own
Stolen  Generations  from  indigenous  people,
further  Australian media interventions in  the
l i fe  of  Wawa,  an  already  traumatised
indigenous child, should certainly be off limits.
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